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PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND 
JURISDICTION 
The Complaint of Plaintiff, in the Court below, sought 
recovery of the sum of Twenty Thousand Eight Hundred Fifteen 
Dollars and 64/100 ($20,815,64) representing auto parts and 
supplies sold by the Plaintiff to the Defendant business known as 
RTEM, Inc. Specifically, Plaintiff sought to recover from the 
Defendant Shillington by reason of a written personal guaranty 
given by the Defendant in connection with the sale of the goods 
to RTEM. 
After the answer of the Defendant Shillington, a Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed by the Plaintiff, (R. 82.) That 
Motion was accompanied by an Affidavit of Vern K. Yoho, the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Plaintiff (R. 79), 
as well as Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (R. 85.) 
After oral argument, the Trial Court entered judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Shillington. 
The Court ruled that there were no genuine issues as to material 
facts regarding the fact of Shillington1 s execution of an unam-
biguous personal guaranty. 
It is from that judgment that the Defendant Shillington 
filed this Appeal. The matter was originally appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court and was then transferred to this Court pursu-
ant to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As this Court is aware, the decision of the Trial Court with 
respect to factual matters is not to be disturbed unless there 
can be shown that there was no basis in the record for the 
findings made and that the decision of the Trial Court was an 
abuse of discretion. In this case the following facts are 
undisputed and have not been disputed by the Defendant 
Shillington: 
1. The Plaintiff at all times pertinent to this action was 
a corporation in the business of supplying auto parts and sup-
plies to retail jobbers. (R. 86.) 
2. The Defendant Shillington operated a franchising busi-
ness known as "Mr. Parts". Under the Defendant Shillington1s 
program, a retail auto parts franchise would be set up under the 
name "Mr. Parts" with the assistance of Shillington. (R. 86.) 
3. The Defendant Shillington was a primary customer of the 
Plaintiff and used the Plaintiff as the major source of supply 
for the initial inventory to a new franchise operation. 
(Shillington Depo. Pg. 10.) 
4. The Defendant RTEM was a new franchise established under 
the supervision of Shillington, and was for the purpose of 
retailing auto parts. (R. 86.) 
5. When the Plaintiff was asked to supply the initial 
inventory for RTEM, the request was denied because of the lack of 
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financial stability of Mr. Eldon Mecham, one of the principals of 
RTEM. (Yoho Depo. Pg. 10.) 
6. Only after Shillington agreed to be personally responsi-
ble for the goods sent to RTEM did the Plaintiff approve the 
extension of credit. (Yoho Depo. Pg. 12.) 
7. The Defendants RTEM and Shillington executed an applica-
tion for credit with the Plaintiff. (Shillington Depo. Pg. 21.) 
8. Based upon the strength of that application for credit, 
and upon Shillington1s promise to pay, Plaintiff provided goods 
and services to the Defendant RTEM, including the initial inven-
tory merchandise on open account. The balance due on that open 
account was, at the time judgment was sought, Twenty Thousand 
Eight Hundred Fifteen Dollars and 64/100 ($20,815.64). (R. 86.) 
9. The Defendant Shillington signed the credit application 
as a guarantor of the sums due for the merchandise delivered to 
the Defendant RTEM. (Shillington Depo. Pg. 21.) 
10. The Defendant Shillington admits that he understood he 
was guarantying the obligations of RTEM. (Shillington Depo. Pgs. 
31-35.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The position of the Plaintiff is that the entry of Summary 
Judgment by the Trial Court was well supported by the undisputed 
facts and that this Court should not disturb that ruling. T.n 
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specific response to the issues raised by the Defendant 
Shillington, Plaintiff argues as follows: 
1. Whenever there is ample evidence to support the ruling 
of the lower court, this Court must not impose a different 
decision. In the case at hand there is more than enough evidence 
to support the ruling of the Trial Court, The simple fact is 
that the Defendant agreed to sign a personal guaranty of the RTEM 
obligations in order to induce Plaintiff to deliver the invento-
ry. The Trial Court did nothing more than enforce that 
obligation. 
2. The Defendant's reliance upon §70A-3-606 of the Utah 
Code Annotated is not only factually inapplicable but legally 
inappropriate. The Defendant attempts to argue that the Plain-
tiff has somehow impaired the collateral. However, 
§70A-3-606(1)(b) deals exclusively with the holder of a negotia-
ble instrument. See, §70A-3-102. There is no negotiable instru-
ment in the case at hand; §70A-3-606 is therefore inapplicable. 
3. The remainder of the arguments of the Defendant center 
around the contention that the agreement signed by the Defendant 
is somehow ambiguous. However, any such ambiguity is the product 
of the arguments of counsel and is not based in fact. The 
document is, in itself, clear. The spaces which were left blank 
do not create an ambiguity. Most importantly, the Defendant has 
never, by any sworn statement, stated that he did not understand 




THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
This Court is well aware that the standard for review of the 
lower Court's decision is that such ruling cannot be disturbed 
where there is ample evidence to support the same. This Court 
cannot gainsay the decision of the Trial Judge unless it is 
clearly shown that there has been an abuse of discretion. 
The Plaintiff has set out the specific facts which are 
undisputed in the record upon which which the Trial Court made 
its decision. The Defendant has not raised any dispute as to 
those facts. The Defendant has attempted, merely, to create a 
smoke screen so as to obscure the undisputed nature of these 
facts. The statement of Defendant's counsel that the facts are 
disputed does not create such a dispute. 
The undisputed facts are that the Defendant granted a Mr. 
Parts franchise to RTEM and wanted to purchase the initial 
inventory from Plaintiff. Plaintiff would not allow the invento-
ry to go out until the Defendant, himself, had agreed to person-
ally guaranty the obligation of RTEM. Only after that promise 
was received did the merchandise leave the control of Plaintiff. 
The Defendant understood what he was signing and knew that he was 
obligating himself to the Plaintiff. 
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POINT II 
THE RELIANCE OF DEFENDANT ON 
§70A-3-606 IS INAPPROPRIATE 
A good portion of the Brief of the Defendant is taken up 
with a discussion of §70A-3-606(1)(b), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. The Defendant attempts to argue from this 
section of the statute that the Plaintiff lost its right to 
recover against the Defendant on the basis that there was an 
"impairment" of the security. The Defendant's argument is that 
something which the Plaintiff did with respect to the goods sold 
to RTEM prevents the Plaintiff from recovering the balance due 
against this Defendant. This argument must fail for the follow-
ing reasons: 
1. Nowhere in the Brief of the Defendant, nor in any 
pleadings filed with the Trial Court, did the Defendant raise an 
issue as to the disposition of collateral. In other words, there 
is no factual basis for the Trial Court, or this Court, to 
believe that there was any "impairment" of the collateral. If 
the Defendant honestly believed that such was the case, he should 
have set forth, by some competent evidence, his belief. 
2. Even if there were some credible evidence upon which the 
Trial Court could have made a ruling that there was a possibility 
of impairment, it is clear from the statute itself that the same 
does not apply to the facts of this case. The section cited 
specifically provides: 
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The holder discharges any party to the instrument 
to the extent that without such parties consent the 
holder . . . . 
The term "instrument" in the statute is defined at §70A-3-102 as 
follows: 
"Instrument" means a negotiable 
instrument. 
One need only look at §70A-3-104 to know that the personal 
guaranty of the Defendant does not qualify as .a "negotiable 
instrument". 
The Defendant relies upon a statute which is clearly in-
applicable to the case at hand. The issue of impairment of 
security under the Uniform Commercial Code simply has no rele-
vance to the issues before this Court. 
POINT III 
THE PERSONAL GUARANTY SIGNED BY 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT AMBIGUOUS 
A majority of the remaining arguments raised by the Defen-
dant/ those involving the intent of Mr. Shillington, and the 
blank spaces left in the document, have, as their central theme, 
the alleged ambiguity of the agreement itself. In other words, 
in order for this Court to adopt any one of these arguments, this 
Court must first find that the Trial Court erred in ruling that 
the agreement was, itself, unambiguous. 
This Court is well aware of the controlling rule of law when 
dealing with contractual interpretation. The Supreme Court of 
Utah has, on numerous occasions, held that the meaning of a 
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contract is to be determined, where possible, from the language 
used in the document itself. Where that language is unambiguous, 
it is the duty of the Court to enforce the agreement. See, 
Buehner Block, Co. vs. U. W. C. Associates, 792 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1988); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, Co. vs. Salt Lake City, 740 
P.2d 1357 (Ut.App. 1987). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the intent 
of the parties is to be shown from the language of the contract 
whenever possible. See, Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P. 2d 
1060 (Utah 1981); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. vs. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 
(Utah 1977). 
The document which is the subject matter of this action, 
when read in total, specifically sets out to whom the credit is 
to be extended (RTEM) and then contains the following language: 
The undersigned, in consideration of the delivery 
of merchandise by [Yoho Automotive] to the above appli-
cant, agrees personally to assume any liability in-
curred by the above company and guarantees that payment 
will be made strictly according to the terms set forth 
herein. 
Directly below this language, the Defendant affixed his signa-
ture. (R. 10.) The Defendant simply could not have misun-
derstood or been mislead as to the clarity of the language and 
what its effect would be. 
The cases cited by the Defendant, without exception, deal 
with contracts, both oral and written, which were uncertain. The 
case of West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87, 387 P.2d 686 (1963), quoted 
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by the Defendant at page 11 of his Brief specifically makes the 
finding that the documents, in that case, were "ambiguous and 
uncertain". No similar uncertainty exists in the document which 
is the subject matter of this case. 
Similarly, in the Alaska case of DeCristofaro vs. Security 
National Bank, 664 P.2d 167 (AK. 1983), cited by the Defendant at 
page 10 of his Brief, the Court specifically held that there was 
an ambiguity as to a non-competition clause in a contract. The 
Court therefore ruled that summary judgment was not appropriate. 
Again, no similar ambiguity exists in the present case. 
What the Defendant really wants this Court to believe is 
that because certain blanks in the form which he signed were left 
unfilled, the contract is, therefore, unenforceable. In other 
words, the Defendant equates blanks in the contract with ambigu-
ity. 
However, at no time does the Defendant allege, by way of 
sworn statement, that he did not understand what he was signing 
or that he did not intend to guaranty the obligation of RTEM. 
Rather, the Defendant spends much time indicating that he did not 
like the idea of signing the guaranty. The fact that he did not 
like the idea and, therefore, signed "under protest" does not 
exculpate the Defendant from his liability. Indeed, the very 
fact that he was protesting his signature indicates that he 
understood what the intent was. 
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POINT IV 
THE PERSONAL GUARANTY IS 
SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION 
In the Court below, the Plaintiff testified through its 
President, Mr. Vern K. Yoho. As has been indicated in the 
Summary Statement of Facts, Mr. Yoho testified that he allowed 
goods to be sent to RTEM only after receiving the promise of Mr. 
Shillington to be personally responsible for the debt of RTEM. 
Mr. Yoho further testified that without that promise he would 
never have allowed credit to be extended to RTEM. (Yoho Depa. 
Pg. 12.) 
The rule of law is that where there is reliance upon a 
promise to guaranty the debt of another, even if the actual 
guaranty is signed later, there is consideration for the guaran-
ty. This is the specific holding of Ranier National Bank vs. 
Lewis, 30 Wash. App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (1981). 
Indeed, in Northern State Construction, Co. vs. Robbins, 457 
P.2d 187 (Wash. 1969), cited by the Defendant on pages 23 and 24 
of his Brief, the Court dealt specifically with that fact situa-
tion. In Northern, the Plaintiff, in reliance upon a promise of 
another to guaranty the debt, allowed credit to be extended. 
When the guarantor attempted to get out of his liability, the 
Court held that his promise to pay, upon which reliance was made, 
was supported by consideration. 
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Again, the cases cited by the Defendant are simply factually 
irrelevant. In the Moorcraft decision cited by the Defendant on 
page 26 of his Brief, there was no involvement of the guarantor 
in the debt created by the third party. In other words, there 
was no reliance by the Plaintiff on the promise of the guarantor 
to pay. 
In the case at hand the credit was extended solely upon the 
basis of the promise of the Defendant to be personally responsi-
ble. That fact is undisputed and uncontested by the Defendant. 
The consideration for the agreement to pay was the actual exten-
sion of credit. Therefore, the Defendant cannot now claim that 
his promise to pay was unsupported by consideration. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT COERCED 
One of the more unique arguments made by Defendant is that 
he was somehow the object of "business Compulsion" in the signing 
of the personal guaranty. One can only suppose that this argu-
ment is the natural outgrowth of Defendant's belief that he 
signed the document "under protest". However, the facts of this 
case do not come even close to a case of wrongful compulsion or 
coercion. The Courts have long held that business compulsion is 
not established merely by proof that the consent of the party was 
obtained by the pressure of financial circumstances, or by the 
fact that one party insisted upon a legal right and the other 
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yielded. The pressure must be wrongful. See, Starks v. Field, 
89 P.2d 513 (Wash. 1929). Furthermore, action taken by one as a 
result of a deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot 
ordinarily be attributed to duress. See, Imperial Refineries 
Corp vs. Morrissey, 119 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1964). 
In light of the caselaw, the circumstances surrounding the 
Defendant's execution of the agreement, which he knew would 
obligate him as a personal guarantor of RTEM's debts, does not 
rise to the level of "business compulsion". The Defendant was 
reluctant and didn't want to create a hassle. (Shillington Depo. 
pg. 35.) He had alternatives available, however, and no wrongful 
pressure was brought to bear upon him. Clearly, his choice was 
freely made and he is bound by it. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL TO EQUITY 
IS INAPPROPRIATE 
Finally, the Defendant appeals to what can only be described 
as the "conscience" of this Court. The Defendant argues that "as 
a matter of equity" it is "unfair and unconscionable" to hold Mr. 
Shillington liable on such a document, to enforce a guaranty for 
any liability without definition and limitation and to allow the 
Plaintiff to capitalize "on their own errors and negligence". 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Land vs. Land, 605 
P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) declared: 
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Equity is not available to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because 
one has come to regret the bargain made. 1^(3. at 1251. 
Likewise, in Mackey vs. Philzona Petroleum, Co., 93 Ariz. 
87, 378 P.2d 906 (1963), the Arizona Supreme Court held that with 
regard to business transactions between men of sound minds, 
dealing at arms1 length, equity will not give relief against 
merely thoughtless or inadvertent conduct. See also, Diamond 
Fruit Growers, Inc. vs. Goe, Co., 242 Oregon 397, 409 P.2d 909 
(1966). 
The Defendant's sense of morality and justice seems mis-
guided. What is fair is to enforce the agreements of competent 
adults. What is unfair is to allow a party to avoid his just 
debts. 
CONCLUSION 
There is, without doubt, no basis for the appeal taken by 
the Defendant. The Defendant clearly knew what he was doing and 
understood the effect of his signature on the personal guaranty. 
The language of the guaranty is clear and understandable to men 
of ordinary intelligence. The Plaintiff clearly relied upon the 





It is respectfully suggested that the decision of the Trial 
Court was entirely appropriate and should be affirmed by this 
Court. Moreover, the Plaintiff should be entitled to its costs 
incurred in Defending this appeal, as well as the attorney's fees 
incurred as are agreed to by the Defendant in the written 
guaranty. 
Dated this 14th day of October, 1988. 
POOLE &) SMITH 
ffi R. SMITH 
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